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Throughout the history of the United States, the president has often 
quarreled with the Supreme Court over matters of policy and the 
Constitution, but rarely has a president tried to overhaul the Court to 
accomplish his goals. At the start of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's second 
administration in 1937, the nation faced a crisis as the President attempted 
to change the Court that had obstructed his attempts to alleviate the effects 
of the Great Depression. While Roosevelt was understandably frustrated 
with the Supreme Court's thwarting of his policies, the actions he took were 
too drastic to be tolerated by the majority of the population. While many felt 
that the Supreme Court was getting in the way of New Deal legislation, few 
felt that the President had the right to attempt to change it. Opposition to 
this plan extended from Washington, D.C., to the rural United States as 
people realized its implications. The fact that Roosevelt was popular and 
had just won a huge victory in the 1936 presidential election did not neces· 
sarily mean that he had the support of the public in such an unprecedented 
move as to pack the United States Supreme Court. As Roosevelt stub-
bornly pursued his plan, the reactions of the people and changes in the 
policy of the Court made it almost impossible for Roosevelt to win. The 
events of 1937 eventually handed Roosevelt the greatest defeat he had as 
President. 
Roosevelt's conflict with the Supreme Court cannot be understood 
without a look at the events that led up to his decision to pack the Court. 
When Roosevelt became president in 1933, he promised the people of the 
United States that he would tum the country around and lead them into the 
future. He proposed a number of governmental and social reforms which 
he called the New Deal. While many of these reforms were necessary, 
many people felt that the President was becoming too powerful. The 
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reforms were attempts to centralize the government under the authority of 
the executive branch, while at the same time limiting the role of Congress. 
The keys to all of these reforms were the agencies that Roosevelt created 
to act on the new laws. New Deal agencies such as the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) and the National Recovery Administration 
(NRA) were responsible for implementing the laws under the authority of the 
president. 1 
Roosevelt, unlike his predecessor, had no problem exercising national 
influence in the affairs of the state governments during the Depression. He 
believed that the national government had to take a stand to aid those who 
were in need. Many of his early programs were designed to give immediate 
monetary aid to the people who needed it the most. Roosevelt approved 
federal aid that would supply millions of dollars to the poor. By the end of 
his first year, over five million people had received assistance from the 
federal government. At the same time, he realized that there would have to 
be programs that benefitted people in the long run, establishing work 
programs and long term employment. 2 
One of Roosevelt's most controversial reform projects was the National 
Recovery Administration (NRA). The NRA attempted to facilitate economic 
growth by controlling the industrial powers in the nation. While this would 
attempt to create work for the people, its purpose was to regulate and 
reform the factory system in the United States. Reforms, such as the 
recognition of labor unions and the elimination of child and sweatshop labor, 
were the concern of many who passed this bill, despite the constitutional 
questions that it raised. The NRA's constitutionality was questioned even 
before it passed through Congress. Many people doubted the consti-
tutionality of the clause that gave the president the ability to create legal 
codes for factories. Still others questioned the role the NRA wquld have in 
regulating intrastate commerce. Despite this, Roosevelt went ahead and 
signed the legislation, believing the factories had to function and produce 
goods in order for the economy to improve. Similarly, the people had to work 
in order to be able to purchase products. It was hoped that this admin-
istration would accomplish both of these goals. 3 
1Arthur M. Schlesinger, The New Deal In Action, 1933-1939 (New York: Macmillan, 
1940), 2-3. 
21bid., 5-6. 
3Joseph P. Lash, Dealers and Dreamers: A New Look at the New Deal (New York: 
Doubleday, 1988), 122-25. 
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The unanswered constitutional questions brought about the NRA's 
downfall when it came before the Supreme Court. While the NRA had been 
created with good intentions, it had overreached the boundaries that many 
believed were acceptable for a national administration. From the very 
beginning, people had questioned the ability of Congress to create any law 
giving the President the power to make programs that did not have to go 
through Congress first. When the NRA finally came before the Supreme 
Court, the unanimous decision struck it down, because it gave the president 
powers that he could not constitutionally have. Even without the question 
of presidential interference, the NRA would have been destroyed because 
of the role that it had been assigned in the regulation of intrastate 
commerce. The Supreme Court restated the established doctrine that 
Congress had no right to regulate intrastate commerce; the NRA was thus 
unconstitutional because of this attempt. It was at this point that the first real 
split between the President and the Supreme Court could be seen. While 
Roosevelt had some reservations about the monopolistic qualities in the 
NRA, he had backed it as being for the good of the nation. When the 
Supreme Court ruled that the NRA was unconstitutional, Roosevelt saw it 
as an attack on himself and his attempt to help the nation.4 
Even before the defeat of the National Recovery Administration, the 
Supreme Court had struck several blows at New Deal Legislation that 
angered the President and dismayed the people. To give pensions to 
retired railroad workers, Congress created the Railroad Retirement Act in 
1934. When this case came before the Supreme Court, a small majority of 
the justices ruled the entire law was unconstitutional. This made it 
impossible for Congress to go back and make the Railroad Retirement Act 
acceptable. While the majority prevailed in this case, the minority was vocal 
in its criticism of the decision. Unlike the later NRA case, the minority 
number of justices did not see this as infringing on the intrastate commerce 
powers of the state. In 1934, in the Fraizer-Lemke Act decision, the Court 
eliminated the aid farmers had been receiving on their mortgages. For the 
first time, many saw how the Supreme Court could affect the nation, and 
many felt that the President was justified in his anger at the justices.5 
Roosevelt soon found that he had support for his Supreme Court plan. 
Due to actions taken by the lower courts, Congress now felt that it had 
4Schlesinger, The New Deal in Action, 18-19. 
5Robert Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (New York: Vintage, 1941), 
104-07. 
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justification to attack the courts. From the beginning of New Deal legislation, 
many of the lower courts had attempted to stop or limit the authority of the 
administrations. In a number of cases, these were conservative justices that 
were acting with the approval and support of the businesses that the legis-
lation was attempting to change. Many of the lower courts were hostile to 
the attempts that Congress and the President were making to grasp more 
power. While the Supreme Court did not uphold the decisions of the lower 
courts in some of these cases, enough laws were found unconstitutional for 
the entire judiciary to come under scrutiny. It did not help matters that even 
when the lower courts did decide in favor of an act, such as the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA) in 1936, other judges often ignored the decision and 
attempted to restrict the power of the laws. From the view of an outsider, it 
would seem that the judiciary was at war with itself, as well as the other two 
branches of the government.6 
For many, the last straw occurred in 1936, when the Supreme Court 
ruled that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) was unconsti-
tutional. The AAA had been created as a form of relief for the farmers of the 
nation. The administration tried to curb overproduction by paying farmers 
to plow under their crops and limiting the number of acres they planted. The 
AAA made millions of contracts with farmers that guaranteed prices for their 
crops and attempted to regulate how much of a certain crop would be 
produced in a year. By the end of 1934, the result was higher prices, but 
much of this could be attributed to the drought that limited the p[oduction of 
many crops. While the AAA helped the farmers, it hurt the people living in 
the cities who now had to pay higher prices.7 When the Supreme Court 
ruled that the AAA was unconstitutional, all the good it had done came to an 
end. The Supreme Court decision stated that Congress had attempted to 
take over the state power of controlling agriculture and production within its 
boundaries. The taxes that the federal government had created to make 
crop payments to the farmers were also unconstitutional. The Supreme 
Court allowed the AAA to continue to exist, but without the money for 
payments or the ability to regulate the amount of a crop produced, its main 
function had been destroyed. The peoples' reaction to this was one of 
shock. While this program had its detractors, no one could doubt that it had 
been successful in increasing farm prices and supporting the farms.8 
6tbid., 115-121. 
7Schlesinger, The New Deal in Action, 21-22. 
81bid., 23. 
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Roosevelt was unable to act immediately upon his growing animosity 
toward the Court. He had to turn his attention to winning the presidential 
election of 1936. Roosevelt was at the height of his popularity. When the 
results were counted, he had won an unprecedented majority of the 
electoral votes, carrying every state except Maine and Vermont. With this 
victory, Roosevelt brought the Democratic party to its most powerful majority 
in recent memory. Both houses of Congress were controlled by the Demo-
cratic party and could be counted on to vote the way the President wanted. 
The only branch of the government that remained outside Roosevelt's grasp 
was the Judiciary, which continued to frustrate him at every opportunity.9 
With his overwhelming victory in the presidential elections, Roosevelt 
became convinced that any action he took would have the blessing of the 
people. With the obvious support he had, Roosevelt felt that he had been 
given a mandate from the people to ensure the security of the nation's well-
being. To the President, this meant that any and all actions that would 
ensure swift and permanent solutions to the problems the nation faced 
would be implemented.10 With the support of the nation, Roosevelt 
announced his plans to overhaul the federal judiciary. Despite his popu-
larity, this proposal immediately brought about a rash of criticism, as well as 
a split in the Democratic Party. Some felt that the judicial branch should not 
be tampered with, and they were willing to fight the President to ensure the 
future security of the nation. 
Roosevelt's plan to change the Supreme Court was simple and straight-
forward. When his proposed legislation passed, he would add another six 
justices to the Court. These would eventually replace the six on the bench 
currently over seventy years of age. As old justices retired, the appointees 
would take over until the number of justices was once again nine. With this 
proposal, the President felt he could finally get the Court on his side by 
appointing justices that would be loyal only to him. His attack on the older 
justices was based on his belief that people over seventy could not perform 
all the duties the office required. The new, younger justices were necessary 
to keep the Court moving smoothly, as well as bringing it into the future. 11 
SWilliam E. Leuchentburg, "Franklin D. Roosevelt's Supreme Court 'Packing Plan, •• 
in Essays on the New Deal, ed. Harold M. Hollingsworth and William F. Haimes (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1969), 69. 
10Leonard Baker, Back to Back: The Duel Between FDR and the Supreme Court 
(New York: Macmillian, 1967), 4. 
11 1bid., 8-9. 
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This court packing plan was not the only possible solution toward the 
problem that Roosevelt was having with the Supreme Court. Before 
Roosevelt announced this plan, he had considered several other solutions 
but abandoned them as too time consuming. The most talked-about 
solution was a constitutional amendment that would have allowed Congress 
to overrule split decisions. This would have been possible with a two thirds 
vote, similar to the way that Congress could override a presidential veto. 
While these plans may have been accepted by the public as emergency 
measures, the impatient President felt they would take too long. He was not 
sure that he could force a constitutional amendment the way he could force 
a bill through Congress. He was unwilling to take that chance. More 
importantly, Roosevelt felt that the Constitution did not need to be changed. 
The Court was the only entity in need of change. Even with an amendment, 
the actions of Congress could be destroyed by a hostile Court.12 
The court packing proposal came as a shock to those who were the 
president's greatest supporters. While everyone agreed that the Court was 
in need of some reform, most within Roosevelt's circle believed that trying 
to enlarge the Supreme Court was an overly drastic measure. By 
attempting to pack the Court, the President would run the risk of looking like 
a tyrant or a bully. Most believed that the balance of power had to be 
maintained, and Roosevelt's plan would tip the balance too far in favor of the 
executive branch. Even if the Court did not become subservient to the 
president, the idea that the president could change the Court at will would 
have been established. Most of the people in Roosevelt's circle of friends 
were shocked by his radical plan. They had never seen this radical side of 
Roosevelt before this time. It made many wonder if his overwhelming 
victory had given him a sense of invulnerability in the face of what would 
surely be great opposition.13 
While Roosevelt had some loyal supporters, he soon found himself 
opposed by those he had considered to be his allies. The most surprising 
of these was the split between the President and Senator Burton. K. Wheeler 
of Montana. Wheeler disliked the secrecy in which the bill had been 
created. No one but Roosevelt's attorney general had any idea that the 
President was planning such a drastic measure. Wheeler was the first 
significant Democrat to break with Roosevelt over this plan. Wheeler feared 
12Leuchentburg,"Roosevelt's Supreme Court 'Packing Plan,'" 73-74. 
13Kenneth S. Davis, Into the Storm, 1937-1940: A History (New York; Macmillian, 
1967), 55. 
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this scheme would put too much power in the hands of the President, 
destroying the Constitution in the process. To Wheeler, the President's plan 
was an attempt to demolish the Supreme Court with an arrogant and 
unconstitutional attack. The President's plan would destroy the inde-
pendence of the judiciary and upset the balance of powers the founders of 
the Constitution had established. Wheeler feared that if this plan were 
allowed, Roosevelt would continue to gain power until the U.S. became a 
dictatorship, and it quickly became his mission to oppose the court packing 
plan.14 
After Wheeler split publicly with the President, Roosevelt tried to get him 
back into his corner, but Wheeler was intent on opposing the President's 
plan. Charley Michelson, publicity director of the Democratic National 
Committee, tried to persuade Wheeler to support the President. Wheeler 
bluntly told him to try to get ''some of those weak-kneed boys and go after 
them because he can't do anything with me."15 While Wheeler did not agree 
with most of the Court's recent decisions, he was unwilling to allow the 
President to have his way with the court, and he would not back down. 
The President's primary argument for restructuring the Supreme Court 
rested on the age of the majority of the justices. He stated that with greater 
age came less stamina, and the system bogged down as the justices grew 
unable to perform their duties. Roosevelt's attempt to gain control of the 
Court was carefully hiddef1 amidst the idea of placing younger justices on 
the bench. The main problem was that while this "new blood" would 
assume the bench, the bill did not eliminate the older justices. The problem 
with this idea was that it relied entirely upon the old judges. If a judge 
retired, the President could appoint whomever he wanted. The only way 
that another judge would be added to the Court was if one of.the current 
justices refused to retired. If a judge would not retire, the legislation gave 
the president the right to appoint another judge to the Court. The new judge 
would not take over for the one already on the bench, he would simply be 
adding his opinion to the decisions. This would not increase the efficiency 
of the Court; it would make the Court's decisions even more divided as the 
new judge's opinion countered the decision of the old judge.16 
14Marian C. McKenna, "Prelude to Tyranny: Wheeler, F.D.R., and the 1937 Court 
Fight," Pacific Historical Review 62 {November 1993 ), 414-415. 
15Burton K. Wheeler and Paul F. Heaty, Yankee From the West {Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1962), 321-22. 
16Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary, 75th Cong., 
1st ses., 1937, Senate Report 711, 4. 
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While it was true that most of the justices on the Supreme Court were 
over seventy, this did not mean they were incompetent nor out of touch with 
the needs of the nation. Senate Judiciary Committee investigations 
revealed that not only were the judges over seventy competent, they were 
often the judges who were the most effective. This created serious doubts 
to the President's claim that the older judges received fewer cases and in 
many cases were in need of replacement.17 
Roosevelt may have wanted to eliminate the older justices on the 
Supreme Court, but, in attempting to do this, he would be taking away some 
of his strongest supporters. Three of these justices, most notably Louis 
Brandeis, age seventy-six, were staunch liberals who had voted in favor of 
the majority of New Deal legislation that had come before them. In reality, 
the President's mission was to eliminate the four conservative justices that 
were blocking all of his attempts at reform. Roosevelt was soQn forced to 
abandon this line of attack. He could find no real evidence of incompetence. 
More to the point, many of the President's backers in the Democratic Party 
were over seventy, and they did not appreciate the notion that anyone over 
seventy was incompetent.16 
The main problem with the court packing bill was that it did not 
accomplish the goal of making the judiciary more efficient and modem. The 
bill's plan, as originally stated, was meant to increase the speed with which 
cases were read, as well as the number of cases, and to give the courts a 
more modem outlook. Roosevelt felt that this was necessary in a time when 
the decisions of the Court affected a nation already reeling from the effects 
of the depression. These objectives would have been laudable if the bill 
presented to Congress had done anything to actually give the judicial branch 
these powers. As the bill was stated, the only thing that it could do in the 
case of a judge that had been on the bench too long was to place a new 
judge on the bench beside the one that already existed. In many instances, 
the district that the old judge lived in did not have the backlog of cases that 
would warrant creating a new position. The real reason to make this law 
was to deal with the age of the original judge, and most agreed that this was 
not sufficient reason to create a new judgeship. The bill's solution to this 
problem was the idea of a roving judge that would go where there 
. was a backlog of cases. It was customary for a judge to live in his district 
so that he would know the area. With a roving judge this would be 
171bid., 4. 
16Leuchentburg, "Roosevelt's Supreme Court 'Packing Plan,"' 85-86 .• 
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impossible. This was a dangerous idea: a judge could be moved and put 
in place to deliver verdicts that would favor the party in power over others. 
The idea of a roving judge was hazardous, not only for the judiciary, but for 
the nation as a whole.19 
The biggest problem was that Roosevelt's plan did not accomplish the 
goal of revitalizing the Court because it did not remove the old justices. It 
did not give a base for retirement, and it did not eliminate the problem of old 
judges. The bill that Roosevelt endorsed said nothing about the retirement 
of judges, except that they should retire after they were seventy and had 
served for ten years. This did not mean that the President would not be able 
to appoint older judges. It just meant that the judges could serve for ten 
years and then retire or have another judge come to the Court. There is 
also the fact that the amount of new blood allowed into the Supreme Court 
was limited. If there were fifteen justices on the Court, as the bill allowed, 
the President could not put any more judges on the bench without more 
legislative action.20 
The problem with the court packing bill as stated was that it would have 
given the Congress and the President more power over the Supreme Court. 
If the justices did not find in favor of popular legislation, it would be possible 
for the President to appoint a new justice that might change the decision. 
If the court packing plan passed then the Supreme Court, indeed the entire 
judicial branch of the government, was open to tampering whenever a 
conflict arose. This would have set a dangerous precedent. It would have 
limited the freedom of the judiciary branch guaranteed in the Constitution. 
The founders of the Constitution realized that there had to be a section of 
the government that would not be bound up in the petty disputes of 
politicians. 21 
The method of court reform that Roosevelt attempted was doomed 
almost from the start. What the bill failed to anticipate was the retirement of 
justices after the.new justices had been appointed. If there was a full court 
of fifteen justices, then the President could not appoint another even if they 
all became too old. If there were fifteen justices and one retired, the Court 
would be left with fourteen justices, making a tie possible. If the Court was 
put in a position were a tie was possible, then it would become completely 
19Senate, Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary, 4-5. 
201bid., 7. 
21Aifred Haines Cope and Fred Krinsky, eds., Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Supreme 
Court (Boston: Heath, 1952), 76-77. 
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ineffective. The power of the Supreme Court would be destroyed and any 
good it would have done would cease to exist. The whole point of being 
able to appoint new judges would be lost as the Court turned inward and the 
justices, out of frustration, fought among themselves, in the process 
becoming dependent on the retirement of one or two judges. 22 
While the President was confident that his plan would pass, opposition 
arose immediately after he announced his intentions to change the judicial 
system. While many in the Democratic Party would follow Roosevelt's lead, 
he remained concerned about the reaction of the liberal Supreme Court 
justices when they learned of his plan. It goes without question that one of 
the biggest drawbacks to his plan was the opposition of the liberal justices 
in the Court. Before the President formally announced his plan, he wanted 
to warn the more liberal justices, specifically Louis Brandeis, that this plan 
was not meant as an attack on them. When Brandeis heard Roosevelt's 
proposal, his reaction was similar to that of many others in the nation. He 
stated that he opposed the plan and that he would do what he could to 
ensure that it failed, because it was a serious blunder. While the popularity 
of the President made most believe that the bill would pass, the reaction of 
Brandeis, one of the most liberal justices, was a severe blow to the 
legitimacy of the court packing plan.23 
Roosevelt's fight soon extended past the judicial branch. Members of his 
own party felt that he was in error and soon opposed him. There were those 
who believed that the President was attempting to overthrow th~ American 
system of government, and they would do anything to see that this did not 
happen. Some of the people who became Roosevelt's opponents surprised 
even him. Along with the disastrous defection of Montana Senator Burton 
K. Wheeler, many other influential people soon found reason to oppose the 
President's plan. Previously strong supporters such as the powerful liberal 
Senator George Norris of Nebraska and Senator Hatton Sumners of Texas, 
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, turned against Roosevelt and 
began to campaign against his program. Sumners's change of heart, in 
particular, should have warned the President that his plan would not have 
smooth sailing. Sumners's position on the Senate Judiciary Committee 
assured that as long as he was against the plan, it was unlikely to get a 
favorable review.24 
22Senate, Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary, 1 0-11. 
23Lash, New Look at the New Deal, 295. 
24Davis, Into the Storm, 1937-1940, 65. 
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Those who stayed loyal to the President through the end were those who 
were dependent on Roosevelt and the few who believed that he was truly 
doing the right thing. Many members of the House and Senate that were set 
to vote on this bill had been elected by running on the President's ticket that 
past November. They had chosen to run with Roosevelt, and they often had 
received his endorsement for the election. While many of these people 
sided with Roosevelt out of party loyalty, many of them had serious doubts 
about the legality and the ethics of the proposed bill. Many of the freshmen 
senators and representatives felt that they had no choice but to go along 
with the President's plan. If they did not, they could lose Roosevelt's 
patronage and basically kill their political career. These people often looked 
for a way to oppose the bill, but most were unwilling to risk the political 
backlash if they failed. While this may have shown their loyalty to the 
President, it did not say much about their faith in the legislation. Other 
members of the Democratic party were bullied by Roosevelt, or by Majority 
Leader Joe Robinson, into voting for the plan. It was not until widespread 
animosity toward the bill grew that most felt that it was safe to go against the 
President.25 
This should have been the time when Roosevelt was at his greatest 
power. Instead, he found himself locked in a bitter struggle, with his power 
and prestige being called into question by the people who had just elected 
him. Roosevelt's assumption that the people would go along with anything 
was quickly proven faulty as many came to the defense of the Supreme 
Court. Almost immediately after the President announced his intentions, 
newspapers and magazines around the country began to print editorials that 
blasted the President for attempting to alter the federal judiciary. Roosevelt 
tried to discredit his opponents in the press by saying that they were all 
conservatives. The truth was that the more people learned about the bill, 
the more they disliked it. Through editorials and letters to the editor, some 
of the opinions of the American people were shown. Editorials printed at 
this time called the court packing plan an attempt to make a "paper shell of 
the American Constitution."26 As opposition mounted, the decision of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee would decide the fate of the bill. . 
When the Senate Judiciary Committee's decision against the court 
packing plan came out, it was obvious that the Supreme Court had a hand 
in the decision. The committee had decided that the bill did not meet its 
25Leuchentburg, "Roosevelt's Supreme Court 'Packing Plan,'" 88-89. 
26Cope and Krinsky, Roosevelt and the Supreme Court, 27. 
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stated objective and was therefore unnecessary. The most persuasive 
argument against the bill came from the Supreme Court itself. While the 
justices had decided that they could not ethically defend themselves to the 
public, they did feel that it was necessary to state their opinions and 
arguments against the bill. These arguments came through a letter that 
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes had written for the Judiciary Com-
mittee's hearings. The letter was read by Senator Wheeler, who happened 
to be a good friend of Justice Brandeis. In it, Hughes countered every 
argument that the President had made for the bill. He stated that the court 
had kept up with its business and that it had not allowed any case to linger 
that deserved to be heard. As to the number of justices on the Court, he 
stated: 
An increase in the number of Justices of the Supreme Court 
. . . would not promote the efficiency of the Court. It is 
believed that it would impair that efficiency so long as the 
Court acts as a unit. There would be more judges to hear, 
more judges to confer, more judges to discuss, more judges 
to convince and to decide. The present number of justices is 
thought to be large enough so far as the prompt, adequate, 
and efficient conduct of work of the Court is concerned.27 
With this letter Hughes managed to counter every argument that the 
President had raised for his bill. The logic behind the argument Hughes 
made was nearly irrefutable; the Court had been doing its job. It just had not 
been doing its job in the way that Roosevelt had wanted it to function. 
Even with the Senate committee's decision, Chief Justice Hughes's 
convincing argument, and the majority of the public opinion against the court 
packing bill, Roosevelt refused to abandon the legislation. He still wielded 
great influence in Congress and believed that the bill could still.be passed. 
It is here that Roosevelt let his emotional ties to the bill and its mission get 
in the way of his logic. He had several chances to compromise. He refused 
any and all attempts to alter his bill. The Court damaged his New Deal 
policies and, as far as he could see, it showed no signs of changing; 
therefore, it had to be altered. With the support of Majority Leader Joe 
Robinson, the dependent freshmen senators, and the New Deal loyalists, 
27 Charles Evans Hughes, The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes, ed. 
David J. Daneiski and JosephS. Tulchin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1973), 305-06. 
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the President believed he could still force his bill through the Senate. 
Subsequent events rapidly proved him wrong.28 
The first key to Roosevelt's strategy to go wrong was the sudden rever-
sal of the Court in its decisions on New Deal legislation. Previously the 
Court had rejected almost every important piece of legislation that came 
before it. Suddenly, it was reversing itself for no apparent reason. Some 
speculated this was in reaction to the President's actions, but the real 
reason was the unexpected switch of Justice Roberts. Previously, Roberts 
had sided with the more conservative members of the Court. Now he 
switched sides, voting with the liberal justices on the legislation presented 
to them. Roberts was most likely reacting to the court packing threat when 
he made his change in policy. Because of this, it is seen as a clear attempt 
to destroy the President's plan. It began on March 29, 1937, when Roberts 
decided in favor of a minimum wage bill from the state of Washington. This 
took everyone off guard, including the President, as this bill was similar to 
one presented by New York that had been struck down by the Court. The 
decision came as a complete surprise--no one had expected the Court to 
change its opinion. This decision was followed by two other equally shocking 
changes in the Court's established opinions. The Court decided in favor of 
the National Labor Relations Act and the new Social Security law in narrow 
majorities made possible only by Robert's defection to the other side. With 
these judgments, the Court changed national policy and began to allow the 
state and federal government to have more power in governing the nation.29 
Another blow to Roosevelt's plan occurred when Justice Van Devanter 
suddenly announced his intention to retire. Previously, Roosevelt had been 
angered by his inability to appoint a judge to the Court, and now one was 
being handed to him. Since Van Devanter was one of the most conserva-
tive justices on the Supreme Court, his retirement affected the entire 
makeup of the Court's philosophy. This retirement may have pleased 
Roosevelt on one level, but it created serious problems for his court plan. 
The greatest reason for the creation of the court packing scheme had just 
been eliminated. With the ability to appoint a justice to the Supreme Court, 
Roosevelt could be sure that his views would have more impact.30 
28Leuchtenburg, "Roosevelt's Supreme Court 'Packing Plan,'" 91-93. 
291bid., 94-96. 
30Schlesinger, The New Deal in Action, 47. 
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While the court packing legislation was in jeopardy, the President 
believed that powerful Majority Leader Joe Robinson could force the bill 
through the Senate. The truth about the President's beliefs will never be 
known, for on July 14, just a few days before the bill was going to be voted 
on, Senator Robinson died. Robinson had been the driving force for Roose-
velt in the Senate. He had kept order and loyalty to the President despite 
all of the criticism. Without Robinson to keep the Democrats together, those 
with doubts about the bill found more freedom to express their real views. 
Robinson's sudden death threw the balance of power to the opposition as 
many senators switched sides. The bill went down in defeat.31 
With all of the rapid changes, it seemed that this ill-fated bill would finally 
be put to rest, but Roosevelt was unwilling to give up. Roosevelt attempted 
to get several compromise versions of the bill passed, but the opposition 
resisted all of these attempts. When the bill was voted on, the original 
reason for its existence, altering the Supreme Court, had been removed. By 
this time, the bill was so unpopular that this meaningless version went down 
in flames, being defeated seventy to twenty in the Senate.32 
From the very beginning, the court packing bill had been in trouble and 
the events of the last few months before its vote proved how unnecessary 
the bill really was. The slightest change in the position of the Court had 
almost completely discredited the President's assertion that the Court 
needed to be reformed. While the Court had not voted the way the 
President wanted, its members had decided as they saw fit. The testimony 
of the justices and the statistics behind their work proved that they were 
doing their jobs and keeping to a proper schedule. The age question had 
been answered early on and was generally the weakest argument of the 
President's bill. The older judges worked as well as, if not better than, the 
younger judges. The fact that the Court was the only branch of the govern-
ment not voting his way was not enough of a reason for Roosevelt to 
attempt to change it. 
The fact that Roosevelt even attempted such a scheme suggests the 
tremendous political influence he commanded as he began his second term 
of office. In Roosevelt's assessment of this action, he had no doubt that he 
would be victorious. Despite his popularity, Roosevelt discov~red that he 
was not invincible, as the opposition grew in strength. His stubbornness 
might have been laudable in a different situation, but attempting to subvert 
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the Constitution went beyond a political argument. Once all was said and 
done, the opposition had the power to defeat Roosevelt's court packing 
bill and hand the President his greatest defeat at the height of his popularity. 
